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INSURANCE-FRATERNAL-FAILURE TO PAY ASSESSMENT-WAIVER
-PRESUMPTIONs-Neighbors of Woodcraft vs. Hildebrandt-
No. 13713-Decided February 10, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Holland.
Hildebrandt brought suit to recover upon a fraternal benefit certifi-
cate in which he was named the beneficiary, which was issued to his
wife. At the close of all the evidence both parties moved for a directed
verdict, whereupon the court discharged the jury and found the issues
joined in favor of plaintiff.
1. Where the insurer over a period of time accepts payments of
assessments that are delinquent, such custom and practice is sufficient to
establish a presumption of waiver by the insured as to prompt payment
of the assessments.
2. Such presumption of waiver of prompt payment is rebuttable.
3. Where the presumption of waiver arises, the burden is upon
the insurer to overcome the presumption.
4. Where the evidence shows that the insured did not rely upon
the custom of waiver of prompt payment and had abandoned her policy,
such presumption is overcome by the affirmative acts of the insured.
5. Evidence of insurer shows a compliance with Section 76 of
Insurer's Constitution, requiring the notification by the grand clerk to
any member of the association who was delinquent.
6. In this case the contract of insurance, or certificate, being that
of a fraternal benevolent society, is the implied embodiment of the in-
sured's application for membership, the charter and by-laws of the
society, and the statutes under which it is organized.-Judgment
reversed.
AUTOMOBILES-LIABILITY POLICY-DUTY OF INSURED AS TO CO-
OPERATION-SHAM ANSWER-FRAUD--COLLUSION-Bagley vs.
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company-No. 13279-Decided
February 10, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Bagley sued Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company on an auto-
mobile liability policy. An automobile driven by Bagley collided with
another automobile and Bagley, his wife, his daughter Sylvia, and one
Dora Rogoff, all occupants of the Bagley automobile, were injured.
Sylvia, the daughter, sued her father for damages and recovered judg-
ment for $10,000, whereupon Bagley sued the casualty company for
$5,000, the amount of the policy. The case was tried to the court
without jury. The court rendered judgment for the defendant.
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1. Fraud is never presumed, but must be established by evidence
that is sufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith.
2. There is no contention that Bagley deliberately caused the
accident, pursuant to a plan to collect money from the insurance carrier.
The automobile driven by Bagley was on the wrong side of the road
and there the collision occurred. His daughter was injured. Bagley
refused to verify the answer drawn by the defendant's attorney; but his
refusal was justified, for if he had verified that answer, he would have
committed perjury.
3. When a person takes out liability insurance, he does not make
the insurance company the keeper of his conscience, or become a mere
puppet in its hands; nor is he relieved from his obligation not to swear
falsely. Bagley offered to verify an answer so drawn as to state the
truth, but his offer was refused.
4. There was no fraud perpetrated or attempted. There was no
fraudulent collusion with his daughter or her attorneys; no assumption
of liability within the meaning of the policy and no interference with
the legal procedure within the meaning of the policy. Bagley did not
prevent the defendant from raising any honest issue in the damage suit.
5. There was no collusion between the father and daughter, nor
was there a failure to cooperate with the insurance carrier.--Judgment
reversed.
PERJURY--SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION---SUFFICIENCY OF EVI-
DENCE-Papas vs. The People-No. 13835-Decided February
10, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Papas was tried and convicted of perjury in the District Court of
Pueblo County and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term not less
than one year nor more than 18 months.
1. Helen Lombardi was charged in the district court of Pueblo
County with having committed the crime of aggravated robbery in that
county. One of her defenses was an alibi. Papas testified for the de-
fendant that she was in Denver working in his restaurant on the day
the robbery was alleged to have been committed in Pueblo County. He
was asked on cross-examination if he had not stated in substance to
three officers in Denver that Helen Lombardi was not in his restaurant
all day on the day of the commission of the crime. He denied that he
had made such statements to them. All of the officers testified that he
did make such statements.
2. If Papas knowingly falsely testified under oath that he did not
so state to the officers, he falsely swore to a fact material to the issue
under investigation, namely, his credibility as a witness in the trial of
Helen Lombardi. Nor did the materiality of such statement depend
upon whether Helen Lombardi was or was not in fact in Denver at the
time she was charged with committing a crime in Pueblo.
3. The point in question was his credibility and previous state-
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ments inconsistent with his testimony on the trial were material and
admissible for consideration by the jury in determining what weight, if
any, should be given to his testimony.
4. To be material to the issue, the matter need not be on the
primary issue raised by the plea or involved in the case.
5. A witness may be guilty of perjury, not only by swearing
corruptly and falsely to the fact which is immediately in issue, but also
to any material circumstance which legitimately tends to prove or dis-
prove such fact; or to any circumstance which has the effect to
strengthen and corroborate the testimony upon the main fact.
6. Information examined and held to be sufficient.
7. The evidence supports the conviction.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holland and Mr. Justice Hilliard dissent.
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS-MISJOINDER-DEMURRER---SUFFI-
CIENCY OF COMPLAINT-The Reorganized Catlin Consolidated
Canal Company, et al. vs. The Sunnyside Park Ditch Company,
et al.-No. 13656-Decided January 27, 193 6--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Holland.
The plaintiffs, for different ditch companies operating separate
canals, sought to enjoin the defendants from diverting water from the
Arkansas River and its tributaries, claiming that such diversion was an
invasion of their decreed priorities of right to the use of such water.
Demurrer to the complaint was sustained and the complaint dismissed
upon plaintiff's election to stand upon their complaint as amended.
1. Generally, parties with separate and distinct claims held in
severalty, cannot join in seeking injunctive relief, but there is some flex-
ibility of this rule aimed generally at the prevention of multifarious
litigation.
2. Where it appears that the plaintiffs seek the same character of
relief against defendants who have a general, common defense, and
whose acts are alleged to be performed by more than one of them and
the acts of the defendants would injure the plaintiffs in the same man-
ner by interfering with a common, but similar, right of plaintiffs and
where the defendants each have a community of interest, which ulti-
mately affects all of the plaintiffs and the defendants, such interest being
directly connected with the subject-matter of the controversy, such sev-
eral plaintiffs may join in an action against such several defendants.
3. To avoid misjoinder it is not necessary that each defendant or
each plaintiff be immediately interested in the whole subject of litiga-
tion, but it is sufficient if all the matters in the complaint have a rela-
tion to the other matters therein contained, provided the object of the
complaint is single and that it presents a right general to all the plain-
tiffs, which is alleged to have been invaded by all the defendants.
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4. It is not necessary, in order that all plaintiffs may join all
their causes of action against all the defendants, in an equity suit, that
the complaint allege concert of action on the part of the defendants or
that an alleged design or common plan be followed by unity of action.
-Judgment reversed.
MECHANIC'S LIEN-WAGES-CONTINUANCE--JURY TRIAL-CROSS
COMPLAINT-No. 13870-The Tiger Placers Company vs.
Fisher-Decided January 20, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
This was a suit for wages and foreclosure of mechanic's lien.
Judgment was given as prayed and error is assigned. Fisher, employed
by The Tiger Placers Company, alleged that a certain sum was due him
for labor performed in aid of which he filed statement of lien, seeking
to charge therewith a dredge boat and other property of the company.
As assignee of ten like claims he made similar allegations.
1. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing continuance.
2. Where the complaint is in equity and the cross complaint is
filed for damages, neither party was entitled to trial by jury. The com-
plaint fixes the nature of the suit and by what arm of the court it should
be tried.
3. A dredge boat is subject to a lien for wages.
4. Where laborers are working directly for the owner of the
property, time for filing lien statements does not commence to run until
the completion of the work on which they are engaged.
5. Where the lien statement consists in part of expense and in
part for wages, the expense can be regarded as compensation under the
lien act.-Judgment affirmed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- TAXATION- WARRANTS ISSUED IN
EXCESS OF ANTICIPATED FuND-No. 13639- Georgetown vs.
Bank of Idaho Springs-Decided January 20, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
The bank, as assignee of one hundred eighty-six of the town's
warrants, brought this suit to recover money judgment against the
town and judgment was entered in favor of the bank for $6,320.24,
the full amount prayed for. The warrants were issued for debts in-
curred by the town during the fiscal year, between April 1, 1928, and
March 31, 1929. The complaint alleged that the town diverted the
funds created for the payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the war-
rants to other purposes to the damage of the bank in the amount of the
warrants. The defense was a denial of the diversion and upon the
contention that the warrants were invalid, because of lack of power of
the town to incur the indebtedness for which they were issued.
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1. The contention of the town that the proper action was man-
damus and not for a general judgment cannot be asserted in the Supreme
Court, where it did not take this position in the lower court by filing
its answer on the merits on other grounds and going to trial thereon
without questioning the form of tnt action.
2. If, as alleged, the funds have been diverted to other uses, then
the money is not there and any attempt by mandamus to -compel pay-
ment of these warrants therefrom would be futile. The fund for spe-
cific payment must first be available and there must exist a refusal to pay
before mandamus will lie.
3. Where it appears that for the year in question that the levy
made by the town based upon the value of the assessable property would
have produced $5,870.57 if collected in full of which a part was for
special levies, leaving $4,279.79 applicable to general town expense for
the fiscal year and the town issued warrants payable out of the general
fund for $6,646.75 and the full levy was not collected. Out of the
amounts collected $2,027.25 was paid on warrants, leaving a deficiency
on outstanding warrants of $4,619.50, the amount sued for herein.
Such warrants issued in excess of the anticipated revenue from the ante-
cedent tax levy were invalid unless authorized at an election.
4. The town had the right to issue its warrants against the gen-
eral fund that had existence in fact or law, but not in excess thereof
without the voter's authorization. To issue warrants in excess of reve-
nues without such authorization would be the creation of a debt such
as is prohibited by Section 8, Article II of the State Constitution.
5. In this case, $2,252.54 of the amount of warrants issued all
represents valid obligations of the town, because that amount would not
be beyond the anticipated revenue from the antecedent tax levy. The
last mentioned amount is the difference between the amount possible of
collection and the amount actually collected. This expected amount
against which valid warrants could be issued was a fund having exist-
ence in law and if collected would have existence in fact. For payment
of these valid warrants a special or additional levy could be made if not
beyond the limitation imposed by the town charter as amended by
Chapter 94 of the Session Laws of 1919, or if the limitation has not
been reached or the taxing power fully exhausted during the preceding
years, then the reserve or accumulated power may be exercised in one
year by order of court, even though it exceeds the yearly limitation.
6. To recover the above amount, now determined to be a valid
obligation, mandamus to compel a tax levy for its payment is the proper
remedy. The bank is not now entitled to a money judgment, because
there has been no diversion of funds. The fund did not come into
existence in fact and could not be diverted.
7. Even though the town operated under an original special
charter, such charter, with reference to levying taxes, is governed by the
act of the legislature, Chapter 94 of the Session Laws of 1919, entitled
"An Act to Amend the Charter of Georgetown" and thereafter the
town was required to levy taxes in the same manner as provided by the
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general laws of the State of Colorado and are subject to the constitution
of limitations in such matters.
8. The purpose of this limitation is to keep the state substan-
tially on a cash basis, to prohibi2 the pledging of future fixed revenues,
to forbid the contracting of debts which must be paid therefrom and to
make certain that one general assembly shall not paralyze the next by
devouring the available revenues of both.
9. The balance of the amount of the warrants issued is in excess
of the fund anticipated at the time the warrants were issued and is there-
fore a prohibited debt within the meaning of Section 8, Article 11 of
the Colorado Constitution.-Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young
dissent.
INSURANCE-LIFE--SUICIDE CLAUSE-BURDEN OF PROOF--SUB-
MISSION TO JURY-The Prudential Insurance Company of Amer-
ica vs. Cline, as Executor-No. 13578-Decided January 27,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
The insurance company insured the life of Agnes L. Bjorkman for
$1,000 for the benefit of her husband. The insured died within one
year from the issuance of the policy. Suit was brought by the husband,
the beneficiary. The defense was that the insured committed suicide
within the year. The policy provided, "if within one year from the
date hereof the Insured, whether sane or insane, shall die by suicide, the
liability of the Company shall not exceed the amount of the premiums
paid on this policy." The amount of premiums paid was tendered
back. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, the beneficiary
died and his executor was substituted.
1. The court below instructed, "Suicide must be proven, and if
you can reconcile the facts of this case upon any reasonable hypothesis,
based upon the evidence, that death of the insured was not caused by
suicide, it is your duty to do so." The correctness of the instruction is
not challenged.
2. If the evidence is such as to exclude all reasonable hypotheses
other than that of suicide, then it was the duty of the trial court to take
the case from the jury.
3. The general and natural presumption is against suicide.
4. Evidence examined and held that the trial court did not err in
refusing the defendant's request to take the case from the jury and direct
the verdict for the defendant. The case was for the jury and their
finding, approved as it was by the trial court, should not and will not
be disturbed.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
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DIVORCE-ENTRY OF FINAL DECREE-ENTRY AT REQUEST OF Los-
ING PARTY-Kastner vs. Kastner-No. 13738-Decided February
24, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
The court below, after the expiration of one year from the entry
of findings, entered a final decree of divorce at the instance of the losing
party.
1. Under Chapter 71, Session Laws, 1933, where the successful
party to a divorce action has not applied for a final decree of divorce
within one year after the findings are entered, the unsuccessful party is
permitted to apply for a final decree.
2. The constitutionality of the 1933 enactment is not questioned
and the court below had the power to enter the final decree.-Judgment
affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION OF CO-
DEFENDENT-Miller vs. The People-No. 13663-Decided Feb-
ruary 24, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Miller was convicted of larceny and was sentenced to the peniten-
tiary for five to eight years. The information included two other de-
fendants. Miller was granted a separate trial on the ground that one of
the defendants had made a confession certain parts of which had no
bearing on the guilt or innocence of Miller, but would be prejudicial if
tried together. Hammel, one of the other defendants, was first tried
and convicted. The court below admitted the confession of the co-
defendant, all of which was made out of the presence of Miller.
1. The court erred in admitting the oral confession of Hammel,
one of the defendants, implicating Miller as an accessory before the fact
which was made out of the presence of Miller. This defendant had no
opportunity of cross-examining Hammel, his co-defendant, whereby his
credibility might have been impeached and the jury was deprived not
only of its means of determining the motive or attitude of Hammel but
also of the opportunity to observe his conduct on the witness stand.
2. While statements, confessions and admissions of guilt made
by one of several persons jointly indicted and tried for the same offense
are admissible against the person making them, they are not admissible
against- his co-defendaxnts unless made in their presence and assented to
by them.
3. Where the defendant was an accessory before the fact, only
such parts of the confessions, statements or admissions as would tend to
prove the guilt of the principal could be admitted and not the parts as
would implicate this defendant as an accessory when made out of his
presence and after the commission of the crime.-Judgment reversed.
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TAXATION-PERSONAL PROPERTY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-
EXEMPTIoNS-Koenig, as Treasurer, et al. vs. Jewish Consump-
tives' Relief Society-No. 13664-Decided February 24, 1936-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
The Jewish Consumptives' Relief Society brought injunction to
prohibit the county from taxing its dairy equipment and livestock so
devoted. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled. The county
elected to stand and to review the judgment thereupon entered, it prose-
cutes this writ.
1. Tax exemptions are provided for in Article X of our Consti-
tution. Section 3 thereof exempts "personal property" to the value of
$200 to the head of a family. Section 4 exempts public property, "real
and personal." Section 5 (so far as here applicable) exempts "Lots,
with buildings thereon, if said buildings are used solely and exclusively
* * * for strictly charitable purposes, * * *" and Section 6 reads: "All
laws exempting from taxation, property other than that hereinbefore
mentioned shall be void."
2. The Constitution does not exempt livestock used solely and
exclusively for charitable purposes. It only exempts lots with the build-
ings thereon.-Judgment reversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating, Mr. Justice Holland
dissenting.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FINDINGS OF COMMISSION-CONCLU-
SIVENESS-INTERPRETATION OF-Di Greggorio vs. The Monroe
Coal Company, et al.-No. 13889-Decided February 24, 1936
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Claimant was employed by the coal company whose insurance,
under the act, was carried with the insurance company. He claimed
disability due to an accident. At the hearing the Commission found
"from the medical testimony" that his disability was due to sub-acute
appendicitis and was neither caused nor aggravated by the accident.
There was a further finding that "This accident occurred on February
25, 1935, claimant left work as a result thereof the same day."
1. Such finding is not a finding of disability caused by the acci-
dent such as to oblige cessation of labor. Claimant may well have quit
work as a result of the accident, althought the accident caused no disa-
bility whatever. That the Commission did not intend by the language
quoted to find that the accident caused disability is clearly disclosed by
the rest of the findings and the award.
2. Beyond this the record presents a simple case of a finding of
fact by the Commission on conflicting evidence and such finding will
not be disturbed.--Judgment affirmed.
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BILLS AND NOTES-CONDITIONAL DELIVERY-CONFLICTING TES-
TIMONY-INSTRUCTIONS----Clermenson vs. Bruen-No. 13903-
Decided February 24, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
At a jury trial of a suit brought by Bruen on a promissory note,
judgment was entered on the verdict against Clemenson, the maker, who
assigns error.
1. Where the defendant alleged and testified that the note that
he executed was delivered conditionally and the plaintiff denied the con-
ditional delivery and testified that there was no conditional delivery,
there was such a conflict in the evidence as required the case to be sub-
mitted to the jury.
2. There is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.-Judgment
affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION-RE-
TROACTIVE AwARD-Roeder, etc., vs. Industrial Commission, et
al.-No. 13770-Decided December 16, 1935--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Hilliard.
1. While the claimant's contention, at the latest hearing, was not
so clear as to remove all doubt, nevertheless, under well established
rules, the finding of the Commission has such a record basis so that the
same will not be disturbed.
2. The entire evidence presented at the hearing had to do with
the claimant's then present condition, and there is no evidence whatso-
ever as to the claimant's condition in the past. Therefore, the Com-
mission's retroactive award is without basis in the record, and the award
should have been made as of the date of the hearing.-Judgment re-
versed with orders to amend the award as indicated.
CRIMINAL LAW- INFORMATION - DUPLICITY - Hu m me 1 vs. The
People-No. 13856-Decided December 16, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Butler.
Defendant was convicted of petty larceny on each of six counts,
each count being a separate, independent and unrelated offense. Defend-
ant filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was
bad for duplicity, which motion was overruled. She is now seeking
reversal of the judgment.
1. The information should have been quashed, as it was bad for
duplicity and, in failing to so dispose of the case, the court committed
reversible error.
2. The suggestion that the error was not prejudicial to the de-
fendant is without force.-Judgment is reversed, cause remanded with
direction to quash the information.
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CRIMINAL LAW-INDICTMENTS-MOTION TO QUASH--CONSPIRACY
TO COMMIT BRIBERY-People vs. Wettengel, et al.-No. 13696
-Decided December 16, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Wettengel and others were indicted for a conspiracy to commit the
crime of bribery. The indictment charged that Wettengel was to re-
ceive the bribe and Blackwell and Utter were to give the bribe. Motion
to quash the indictment was granted in the lower court.
1. There is not, in the law, any such crime as conspiracy to
commit bribery where the conspiracy is charged to and included both
the prospective giver and the prospective receiver.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice
Young dissent.
FORECLOSURE OF DEEDS OF TRUST-COLLATERAL SECURITY-
James vs. Ferguson, et al.-No. 13540-Decided December 9,
1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
A deed of trust was given on certain lands and water rights by the
owner, who was also the owner of supplemental water rights repre-
sented by certificates of stock in two reservoir companies. This stock
was pledged as collateral security with the deed of trust which was sub-
sequently foreclosed on all land and water rights specifically described
therein, the bid being for the full amount due. The trustee's deed
described the land and conveyed all "appurtenances thereunto belong-
ing."
QUESTION: Who owned the water certificates pledged as collat-
eral security?
HELD: The ownership of the collateral security passed with the
foreclosure to the purchaser at the sale and the trustee's deed included
such water stock as appurtenances to the land. These water rights
were necessary to give the land the value necessary to secure the amount
of the loan. This is especially true of the water certificates in this case,
as they describe the land to which they attach.--Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DECISION OF COMMISSION ON CON-
FLICTING EVIDENCE-OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE-Schriber-Hart-
man Decorating Company vs. Barton-No. 13820-Decided
December 9, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
The claimant was engaged for a period of several weeks in painting
the baseboards of a certain building. His knees developed a condition
known as "housemaid's knee." The Commission denied compensation,
holding that the condition was the result of long continued kneeling
necessary in the work which the claimant did, and that it was an occu-
pational disease. The District Court made an award to the claimant.
There being evidence to support the findings of the Commission, it was
binding upon the District Court, and the finding by the Commission
determined by necessary inference that the condition from which claim-
ant suffered was not caused by accident.--Judgment reversed.
PLEADING-VARIANCE OF PROOF-The New Mexico Lumber Manu-
facturing Company vs. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Corn-
pany-No. 13609-Decided December 9, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
The sheriff seized under execution certain horses in possession of a
trust company. Trust company demanded possession, which was re-
fused by the sheriff, and thereupon suit was brought against defendant,
as surety on the sheriff's bond. The trust company was a trustee under
a bond issue, and after default took possession, but the horses were not
included in the trust deed. Plaintiff proved an oral pledge of the horses
as additional security for the amount due under the trust deed. The
complaint did not specifically set up the oral pledge, and there was a
fatal variance between pleading and proof.
2. The personal property was located on realty covered by the
trust deed, and notice of the company's possession was posted and notice
referred to the deed of trust as authority for that possession but con-
tained no reference to the oral pledge. This was a fraud on bona fide
creditors or innocent purchasers.--Judgment affirmed.
WATERS-MANDAMUS-RIGHT OF SENIOR RESERVOIR FOR STORAGE
-RIGHT OF JUNIOR DITCHES FOR DIRECT IRRIGATION-DE-
MURRER-The People on relation of the Park Reservoir Com-
pany vs. Hinderlider, et al.-No. 13235-Decided February 3,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Parties are in the same position as they are in the Court below.
Plaintiff has a decree for storage water for irrigation of date October
1, 1888. When spring floods had subsided the stream does not furnish
sufficient water for direct irrigation for lands under ditches taking
therefrom. The priorities of some of these antedate that of plaintiff,
others are subsequent. The total capacity of all exceeds the creek flow.
Defendants, water officials, refused plaintiff the right to store when the
ditches needed the water for direct irrigation, irrespective of the dates
of their priorities. Plaintiff brought mandamus. Defendants demurred
for want of facts and for want of parties. Demurrer sustained.
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1. A senior reservoir may take, for storage, its full appropriation
when a portion of the water is needed by junior ditches for direct irri-
gation.
. 2. Mandamus was the proper remedy. Where the rights of all
parties have been established by decrees entered in general adjudication
proceedings and the remedy sought by mandamus is simply the enforce-
ment of such judgments by water officials charged therewith, other
water users on the stream need not be made parties.--Judgment reversed
with directions.
Mr. Justice Butler specially concurring.
TRESPASS-ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE A CRIME-
WILFULNESS OR INTENT TO DO AN UNLAWFUL ACT-Jones vS.
The People-No. 13861-Decided February 3, 1936--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
Upon an information charging Jones with trespass, he was tried
and found guilty in the Court below and a fine of $50 imposed.
1. A mere negligent trespass on the lands of another is insufficient
to constitute the crime of trespass.
2. The negligence must be accompanied by a wilful act or
that the trespass involved and intent to do an unlawful act injurious
to another's property.
3. Or the evidence must show that the negligent act was
prompted by hostility, revenge or design. Before a criminal offense in
cases of this character can be established, it must appear that the object
of the act was actual mischief or an intended trespass.
4. In this case the act and injury were incidental to negligence.
-- Judgment reversed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NUISANCE-CONTROL OVER BEYOND
CITY LIMITS--St'. Bernard Poultry Farm, Inc., et al. vs. City of
Aurora-No. 13719-Decided February 3, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiffs in error, applied to the City of Aurora for a permit to
construct, establish and operate a fox farm on lands of the poultry farm
then within the city limits. Application was denied but notwithstand-
ing denial the poultry farm proceeded with preparations and the City of
Aurora applied for and was granted an injunction which was later made
permanent. Thereafter, the lands in question were disconnected from
the city and thereafter the poultry farm filed a petition to vacate the
injunction, because the land was no longer within the city limits and
because the city had no jurisdiction. The Court denied the application.
1. It is not necessary to determine the validity of the original
injunction, because the plaintiff had the power to declare what shall be
a nuisance and abate any such within its corporate limits but power is
not conferred upon it to declare and define what shall constitute a
nuisance within a mile beyond its boundaries.
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2. Where the showing to vacate and dissolve the injunction
demonstrated that the injunctive order then included premises beyond
the city limits, the Court should have sustained the petition and dis-
solved the injunction.---Judgment reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE-EXCEP-
TION TO RULE WHERE COMPENSATION PAID--Morrow vs. In-
dustrial Comrission of Colorado, et al.-No. 13815-Decided
March 2, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouch.
Claimant, a school teacher, sustained a compensable injury October
2, 1925, while coaching pupils in their basketball play. She has been
bedridden ever since. No notice of claim was filed by her with the
Industrial Commission until September 28, 1933, almost eight years
after the injury. Her father was principal of the school and after her
injury, with the knowledge of the board, employed a substitute teacher
for $100 a month. Claimant's salary had been $125 a month and she
was paid the difference of $25. The commission denied her claim,
which was affirmed by the District Court.
1. The claimant was required to file a notice claiming compensa-
tion with the Industrial Commission within six months after the injury,
but there is an exception to this rule in that this limitation does not
apply to any claimant to whom compensation has been paid.
2. It was the duty of the school board, as the employer, to give
notice of the injury to the Industrial Commission within ten days after
the injury. This the school board failed to do.
3. The claimant had no.knowledge from any source that it was
necessary for her to give notice of claim.
4. The $25 that was paid to the claimant after she was injured
and could perform no part of her contract as a teacher brings this case
within the exception that no notice need be filed by the claimant within
six months where compensation has been paid.
5. The original opinion, which read for affirmance, is withdrawn
and the present opinion is substituted therefor.--Judgment reversed.
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